In new memoir, ex-Head of State insists Biafran leader frustrated negotiations and forced Nigeria into the 1967 conflict.

Former Nigerian Head of State, Yakubu Gowon, has reignited debate over the origins of the Nigerian Civil War, accusing the late Biafran leader, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, of deliberately sabotaging efforts to keep the country united.

In his autobiography, My Life of Service and Allegiance, Gowon presents a detailed account of the tensions, mistrust, and political breakdown that followed the 1966 coups and culminated in the 1967–1970 war.

According to him, repeated attempts by the federal government to reach a peaceful settlement were consistently undermined by Ojukwu. “He deliberately and effectively thwarted every effort we made to amicably resolve our national issues,” Gowon wrote.

The former military ruler said the federal delegation approached the historic January 1967 Aburi meeting in Ghana with genuine intentions to reconcile, amid widespread anger in the Eastern Region over the killing of Igbos in parts of Northern Nigeria.

“We went to Aburi with open minds and with the sincere hope of finding a basis for national reconciliation,” he stated.

However, Gowon argued that the agreement collapsed due to conflicting interpretations upon return to Nigeria. He maintained that Ojukwu’s version of the Aburi Accord would have severely weakened federal authority and threatened the country’s unity.

“What was presented by Ojukwu as the Aburi Accord was, in reality, his own interpretation of our discussions,” he said.

Despite the breakdown, Gowon insisted the federal government continued to pursue non-violent solutions. He described the period as one marked by deep suspicion and rapidly deteriorating communication between both sides.

“At every stage, we tried to preserve Nigeria without resorting to war,” he added, noting that compromise became increasingly difficult as tensions escalated toward Biafra’s declaration of independence on May 30, 1967.

Gowon also defended the creation of 12 states shortly before the secession, saying the move was designed to protect minority groups in the former Eastern Region from domination.

“The creation of states was intended to give all groups a sense of belonging within Nigeria,” he explained.

He maintained that the federal government did not seek war, but was left with no alternative following the declaration of Biafra. “That action left the federal government with no choice,” he wrote.

Reflecting on the end of the war in January 1970, Gowon stood by his administration’s “No Victor, No Vanquished” policy, describing it as a deliberate effort to heal and reintegrate the country.

“We fought to keep Nigeria one, not to destroy a people,” he said, while acknowledging the trauma and fears that followed the 1966 violence.

Gowon’s account places primary responsibility for the collapse of peace efforts on Ojukwu, offering a sharp contrast to the Biafran narrative, which holds that secession was driven by the Nigerian state’s failure to protect its citizens.

“We exhausted every peaceful avenue available to us. But Nigeria had to survive,” Gowon concluded.